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1975

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE

1976 - 1981

Introduction

1. *Perspectives for Intelligence*, looking five years into the future, are issued annually by the Director of Central Intelligence to provide general guidance for all elements of the Intelligence Community. In particular, these statements of perspectives are designed to stimulate early action and planning on programs requiring long developmental lead times prior to their execution—such as complex technical systems, language training, the augmentation of skills, etc. These Perspectives for 1976-1981 are intended to influence Fiscal Year 1976 decisions whose effects will be felt or results fully manifest only after several years. Near term guidance for Fiscal Year 1976 is provided in the Objectives the Director has submitted to the President, which included both Substantive Objectives (further articulated in the Key Intelligence Questions—KIQs) and Resource Management Objectives. The Director's Annual Report to the President on the work of the Intelligence Community will include comments on steps taken during FY 1976 to meet future requirements as outlined in these Perspectives.

2. The Perspectives open with a general overview of the international political, economic and security environment anticipated during the coming five years (Part I). This is followed by a broad statement of the needs the Intelligence Community will be expected to meet during that period (Part II). More specific guidance is given with respect to activities which should be initiated, or on which planning should commence, in order to meet those needs (Part III). Finally, guidance is provided for implementation of "Perspectives" against major national intelligence problems (Part IV).

3. The Perspectives focus on major national intelligence problems. They recognize three important additional categories of problems, but these requirements are not extensively addressed:

a. Continuing national responsibilities of a lower priority which must somehow be satisfied with limited resources;

b. The requirements of civilian and military components of the United States Government for departmental or tactical intelligence support which often parallel national needs and also necessitate continuing attention and resources;

c. Unanticipated situations or crises capable of posing major political, economic or security problems for the United States. Since it may not be possible to meet the demands of such unanticipated problems by a realloca-

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6. *Eastern Europe.* While Eastern Europe will continue to be under Soviet control, economic uncertainties and recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties with Moscow will complicate the picture. Poor in natural resources, the region is faced with a slowdown in economic growth rates which could have repercussions at the political level. The five-year period could see an explosion within some East European country against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would quickly reestablish its hegemony, by force if necessary, whatever the price in terms of other policies. Less spectacularly, individual regimes may find themselves able gradually to expand some areas of autonomy, primarily in domestic policy, while adhering to Soviet guidance in foreign policy and security matters. The passing of Tito could open a period of difficulty and contest over the succession and over the external orientation of Yugoslavia, a period that could be risky should the Soviets try to intervene, either to prevent a westward drift or to pull the country eastward.

7. *The Middle East.* This region seems bound to continue to be both volatile and dangerous. Even if significant progress is made over the next five years in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, considerable distrust will persist, providing a favorable atmosphere for those Arab elements rejecting a final settlement. A breakdown in the negotiation process is likely to lead to another round of war. As a further source of instability, the policies of important states are strongly dependent on individual leaders—such as Sadat, the Shah, Hussein, and Asad—whose departure could lead to major shifts in national behavior.

The US interests which are threatened by these possibilities are not likely to decline substantially over the period. Arab oil will not become less important to the US economy and will remain vital to our major partners. Meanwhile, the accumulation of oil revenues will magnify the potential for international monetary distortions. While there are important trends which favor an increase in US influence in the region, these trends will remain subject to sudden reversal.

9. *New Powers and Blocs.* OPEC's disruption of the non-Communist world's energy situation is likely to inspire further attempts at cooperative efforts by small nations to control other important raw materials, such as bauxite and phosphates. Although most of these attempts will fail, efforts to form various types of pro-

domestic and international issues with which they are concerned; (2) the presentation of these issues in a context which accounts for all significant factors that impinge upon them; and (3) the assessment of the intentions and likely courses of actions of these leaders as well as the capabilities of their countries.

In addition, the Intelligence Community is faced with the requirement to: (1) more effectively identify that which is significant from the large volumes of raw information, and to put it in manageable form; and (2) devise techniques for rapidly and accurately communicating to consumers the essential elements of foreign situations and the reliability of these assessments.

2. *The USSR.* The USSR will remain our major intelligence target. Intelligence will be expected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities, economic activity, and efforts to acquire advanced scientific and technological skills to improve military and economic capabilities. It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of Soviet political dynamics and intentions. While a small percentage of data for these assessments will become available through open exchange and access, the Soviets will try to keep much more of this information secret, and extraordinary efforts will be required to obtain and understand it. One specific priority task will be accurate and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitation agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military field otherwise, special attention will be focused on Soviet research and development applicable to weapons and supporting systems which could substantially affect the balance of power. These will include antisubmarine warfare, ballistic missiles, satellites, and advanced technology systems. The greater political unity of non-nuclear forces and perhaps an increasing disposition for their use, at least by some of the Soviet client states, will put a greater burden on intelligence to maintain a current baseline of information on such forces. It will also mean maintaining capabilities for tactical intelligence coverage of potential crisis areas and for rapid crisis augmentation of such coverage.

Intelligence will need to keep a running estimate of Soviet calculations of their overall foreign policy balance sheet, and to anticipate shifts in area or emphasis as well as in the general line. Particularly important elements in this larger estimate will be Soviet-US, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Soviet-US relationships, followed by Soviet leverage and intentions in Western Europe and the Middle East. Anticipating the relative smoothness or turmoil of phases of Soviet succession politics, and the implications of this and any new leadership policy consensus will be an important intelligence task, as will the identification of significant reform tendencies or trouble areas in the Soviet economy.

3. *China.* China will continue to be an important intelligence target. The closed nature of Chinese society will make it difficult to assess any turmoil within the country, its leadership perceptions of threats to China's security, or threats China might pose abroad. The latter will become particularly important as Chinese strategic power grows and comes to include capabilities against the United States itself. It will also apply to Chinese political activities and intentions in view of China's influence in the Far East and its ties with and aspirations in the developing countries.

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5. *Eastern Europe.* Eastern Europe will be a constant collection and assessment target, in order to assess stability in an area where breakdowns in internal order or major divergences from Moscow could have profound political repercussions. An increasing need to tailor US policy to the specifics of each East European country will call for improved intelligence. During the five-year period, the most important intelligence target probably will be Yugoslavia, where a shift in international alignment actually is a possibility. Rumania's growing propensity to develop independent economic and political linkages to the West and China looms as another possibility.

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7. *Other Priorities.* Intelligence will increasingly be expected to warn of, and explain, new situations posing problems to American interests. For an example, intelligence will be expected to identify the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in developing countries, so that the component elements of these problems can be isolated, negotiated about, or countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may require intensified efforts on our part to